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 RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS by Michael Oakeshott.
 Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press, 1991. Pp. xxvi, 556. $24.00 (cloth), $7.50
 (paper).
 THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL OAKESHO7T by Paul
 Franco. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991. Pp. 227. $30.00.
 Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990) was a political philosopher associated for
 most of his academic career with Caius and Gonville College as Official
 Fellow and Lecturer in History and later with the London School of Econom-
 ics as Professor of Political Science. His name is sometimes mentioned with
 those of two other famous thinkers associated with the LSE-Karl Popper
 and F. A. Hayek-and like them he has had a notable influence on contem-
 porary political thought. Yet whereas Hayek and Popper wrote a great deal
 on a variety of topics and were often at the center of academic controversy,
 Oakeshott wrote little, was not much given to academic disputation (with the
 exception of a reply to critics in a 1975 symposium in the pages of this
 journal) and, for many, remains an enigma.
 On what does his growing reputation rest? At least in part, it rests on a
 volume of essays first published in 1962. Rationalism in Politics (now
 handsomely reprinted by Liberty Press, with the inclusion of six of
 Oakeshott's less accessible essays) was the second book he published,
 following Experience and Its Modes in 1933. The essays in it touched on a
 number of separate topics, from the activity of being a historian to the moral
 life in the writings of Thomas Hobbes to the errors of rationalism. Yet among
 the various essays certain common themes emerge, and a distinctively
 "Oakeshottian" disposition is revealed. Most obviously there is the disdain
 for "rationalism," particularly rationalism in politics.
 Rationalism, for Oakeshott, identifies that attitude or cast of mind that
 elevates the intellect or reason above tradition or practice. In politics, the
 rationalist seeks perfection, or at least is guided by such a conception, and
 favors uniformity. At the heart of rationalism is a theory of human knowledge
 that views all knowledge as technical in character. In politics, the rationalist
 temper reduces traditions to ideology, habits of behavior to comparatively
 rigid systems of abstract ideas. And the modern world is indeed infected by
 rationalism-so much so that even those trying to resist it have been over-
 come. Thus of Hayek's Road to Serfdom Oakeshott comments that the
 significance lies not in the cogency of its doctrine but in the fact that it is a
 doctrine:
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 A plan to resist all planning may be better than its opposite, but it belongs to the same
 style of politics. And only in a society aleady deeply infected with Rationalism will the
 conversion of the traditional resources to resistance to tyranny of Rationalism into a
 self-conscious ideology be considered a strengthening of those resources.
 Oakeshott's resistance to rationalist tendencies is offered in his open
 reflections on rationalism and the ideal of rational conduct. It also comes
 through very clearly in his interpretation of Hobbes, whom he judges to have
 seen, more clearly than most, the nature of the individual as, above all, a
 passionate creature, the resolution of whose predicament is not religious or
 intellectual but emotional. Such a resolution requires the removal of obsta-
 cles to the pursuit of Felicity, and this is to be found in that condition of peace
 called civil association. It is in his discussion of this point in his justly famous
 "Introduction" to Leviathan that Oakeshott makes plain how much his own
 political philosophy both contributes to and takes off from this interpretation
 of Hobbes. Politics, he writes there (in a passage mysteriously omitted in the
 Liberty Press reprint),
 is a second-rate form of human activity, neither an art nor a science, at once corrupting
 to the soul and fatiguing to the mind, the activity of those who cannot live without the
 illusion of affairs or those so fearful of being ruled by others that they will pay away
 their lives to prevent it. And a political philosophy which represented the gift of politics
 to mankind as the gift of salvation itself would be at once suspect if not already convicted
 of exaggeration and error.
 The great political philosophers, he thinks, recognized that politics is "con-
 tributory to the fulfillment of an end which it cannot itself bring about"; and
 while it is not to be despised, neither is it to be overrated.
 For Oakeshott, the political dimension of experience is only one among
 many. A large part of his concern is to resist those who regard it as preeminent.
 His broader concern, however, is to say that there are many ways in which
 human life is conducted and many aspects under which that conduct might
 be understood and to argue that attempts to account for human experience
 under a single rubric-such as science or philosophy or practice, for example
 -are fundamentally in error. This is the theme of one of his most interest-
 ing-albeit elusive-essays: 'The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of
 Mankind."
 Anyone wishing to discover what Oakeshott has to offer would do best to
 begin with Rationalism in Politics, and with the Liberty Press volume in
 particular. The essays have been usefully arranged in thematic order, and the
 additional essays on "Political Discourse," 'The New Bentham," "Logos and
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 Telos," "The Masses in Representative Democracy," and "Talking Politics,"
 along with his "Introduction to Leviathan," help to extend our understanding
 of Oakeshott's thought.
 Yet for all the merits of the volume, its study will still leave many
 unanswered questions, for the essays remain only a part of Oakeshott's
 work as a political philosopher. And Oakeshott was very much, and self-
 consciously, a political philosopher. To come to terms with his political
 philosophy, and particularly with his theory of the state, it is necessary to
 look at his major work, On Human Conduct. For guidance in understanding
 that political philosophy, in its development and in its culmination in that
 work, one could not do better than to read Paul Franco's The Political
 Philosophy of Michael Oakeshott.
 Franco's book maintains that three aspects of Oakeshott's work deserve
 serious consideration. The first is his view of the nature of philosophy and of
 political philosophy in particular. The second is his critique of rationalism,
 along with his own account of practical rationality. The third, and according
 to Franco the most important, is his contribution to liberal theory, for
 Oakeshott is held to have offered "the most sophisticated and satisfying
 contemporary statement of liberalism to date," having done "more than any
 other thinker to purge liberalism of the economism and materialism which
 have often appeared to constitute its moral ideal and rendered it vulnerable
 to attacks from both the Right and Left" (p. 2).
 Franco's method is one of textual exposition, going in roughly chronolog-
 ical order, beginning with Experience and Its Modes and concluding with On
 Human Conduct. The most important feature of this exposition, however, is
 the central importance it attaches to Oakeshott's analysis of the major forms
 of experience of knowledge-philosophy, history, science, and practice-in
 Experience and Its Modes. This is to correct the mistaken view of Oakeshott,
 which sometimes emerges out of an exclusive reading of Rationalism in
 Politics, as a kind of Burkean conservative. Franco tries to show that
 Oakeshott's political philosophy has its roots in a view of philosophy that
 rejects not only positivism and historicism but also "pragmatism" or the view
 that philosophy must be governed by the demands of practical life. In
 Experience and Its Modes, this philosophy is expounded in a theory of
 knowledge that rejects the separation in traditional logic of universal and
 particular, maintaining that universality and particularity are united in the
 notion of the concrete universal. This philosophical approach has its roots in
 Hegel, in Oakeshott's case reached via the thought of F. H. Bradley. Franco's
 thesis is that the essays in Rationalism in Politics are best read in the light of
 this "concrete logic" elaborated in Experience and Its Modes.
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 This is important for Franco's later arguments, for it is on the basis of this
 reading of Oakeshott that he hopes to show the strength of the theory of civil
 association that forms the heart of his liberalism. Indeed, Franco argues that
 it helps us to see how the Hobbesian and Hegelian elements in Oakeshott's
 thought do not reflect any tension between his "libertarian" individualism
 and his traditionalism. What we find in Oakeshott, particularly in the work
 in which his political thought is brought to a culmination, is a synthesis of
 the Hobbesian and Hegelian strands of historical outlook. Understanding
 this, Franco suggests, would give us not only a better grasp of Oakeshott's
 thought but also a clearer appreciation of liberalism.
 Franco's work gives us the most thorough study we have to date of
 Oakeshott's thought; it is also an impressive contribution. The subject matter
 is undeniably difficult, for, however elegant his prose, Oakeshott's philo-
 sophical writing is dense and elusive-and at times downright obscure.
 Franco is tireless in unraveling the complexities and explaining the consis-
 tency underlying the philosopher's apparent contradictions. His exposition,
 if uncritical, makes Oakeshott clearer and more comprehensible.
 The slightly unsatisfactory character of Franco's study, however, stems
 from the fact that the author deliberately eschewed critical analysis for
 exposition on the grounds that interpretation was a necessary first step that
 had to precede criticism. In many ways the exposition would have been
 strengthened by some critical analysis-it is often best to show how some-
 thing is supposed to work by showing what is wrong with it. It would also
 have helped to make greater use of comparisons with other thinkers. For
 example, the discussion of Oakeshott's conception of science would have
 been improved by a comparison with Popper and especially Hayek.
 Oakeshott conceives of science as a form of inquiry sub specie quantitatis;
 Hayek, however, insists that measurement and quantification are not essen-
 tial to scientific investigation and are hindrances to progress in the social
 sciences. This difference may reflect a deeper distinction between two
 different meanings of science: a distinction that a fuller comparative analysis
 might bring out.
 The same point might be made afortiori with respect to Franco's impor-
 tant discussion of Oakeshott's view of the nature of political philosophy.
 There is an interesting comparison to be drawn here with Rawls's view-
 expressed largely in his essays of the 1980s-of the task of normative
 political philosophy as fundamentally apractical task. This contrasts sharply
 with Oakeshott's view that philosophical definition can do nothing to further
 the aims of practice. Comparison between Rawls and Oakeshott at this point
 could be very illuminating, as both acknowledge a certain debt to Hegel.
 Rawls, however, appears to take his Hegel from John Dewey, whereas
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 Oakeshott views Hegel through the British Idealists, and through Bradley in
 particular. It is also worth noting that Rawls differs from Oakeshott in
 insisting on the independence of political philosophy from philosophy.
 A fuller comparison with Rawls would also have been welcome because
 of Franco's professed concern to shed some light on the so-called liberal-
 communitarian debate, and on the debate about liberalism more generally.
 The six pages on this subject form the least satisfactory part of the book,
 largely because Franco allows himself only the space to make a few sugges-
 tive observations and does not pursue the analysis to any great depth. Perhaps
 it is because it is difficult to go deeper without exposition becoming
 embroiled in critical analysis. Yet had a scholar of Franco's considerable
 talents chosen to take this path, we might have enjoyed an even finer study
 of Oakeshott's thought.
 -Chandran Kukathas
 Australian Defence Force Academy
 THEPLACE OFMORALITYINFOREIGNPOLICYby Felix E. Oppenheim.
 Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1991. Pp. xi, 112. $27.95.
 This book sets forth the author's view of the place that morality should
 play in the formation of foreign policy. The answer is that it should play only
 a small role and none when its recommendations conflict significantly with
 national interest. National interest must be the chief consideration behind
 foreign policy.
 Oppenheim does not explain what he means by a "morality." He might
 accept my own definition of "a person's morality," as a person's having
 aversions to types of conduct A, along with a disposition to feel guilty or
 remorseful if he does A without an excuse, and to disapprove others who do
 A without an excuse, and also his thinking that these attitudes are in some
 appropriate way justified. If we so define it, there are, as he says, many varied
 moralities around the world. Oppenheim's view is that there is no "objective"
 way to resolve disagreements among them (p. 19). They are matters of
 subjective commitment. So he is a noncognitivist about morality. These
 views about moralities are not seriously argued in the book.
 Let me now summarize the structure of his argument.
 First, his conception of "rationality." He states that "an actor acts ration-
 ally if he maximizes his net expected utility, where 'utility' is taken in the
 broad sense of satisfaction of the actor's preferences, whatever they may be"
 (p. 16). So he takes an instrumental view of rationality but with the exception
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